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Introduction 
The impetus for the development of principles-based ethics in 
contemporary health care may have been the Belmont Report, a work of the 
federal government dealing with the protection of human subjects of 
research.] Subsequent researchers have further explored and commented 
on principles-based ethics to the degree that it can be stated with 
confidence that the prevailing theory of bioethics in current usage is based 
on variously defined sets of principles.2 The de facto standard has 
generally come to be accepted as the four-principles approach advocated 
by Beauchamp and Childress in what has become a standard reference text 
in bioethics, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (1994). 
The four principles espoused by Beauchamp and Childress are 
autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice. The authors defend 
these principles on the basis that they "initially derive from considered 
judgments in the common morality and medical tradition that form (the) 
starting point in (their) volume."3 However, their list of principles is not 
exhaustive. Other researchers have added veracity, confidentiality, 
integrity, utility, double effect, and respect, among others, to the list.4 
In spite of some disagreement on a list of universal principles, the 
model of a principles-based bioethics, and particularly the four-principles 
approach, enjoys wide acceptance in both professional and academic 
bioethics communities. 
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However, in fairness to those who disagree with principles-based 
bioethics, this grounding of bioethics on "principles" is not without 
controversy. Clouser and Gert argue that the "principles of biomedical 
ethics" approach, what they call principiism, is 
. . . mistaken about the nature of morality and is misleading as to the 
foundations of ethics. At best, "principles" operate primarily as 
checklists naming issues worth remembering when considering a 
biomedical moral issue. At worst, "principles" obscure and confuse 
moral reasoning by their failure to be guidelines and by their eclectic 
and unsystematic use of moral theory. 5 
This paper will seek first to briefly review the various principles that 
are widely commented upon in the bioethics community. Second and 
foremost, it will seek to examine and contrast the principles of autonomy 
and respect. The distinction between the two is important. Autonomy, 
widely viewed as the cornerstone of secular bioethical principles, is often 
used to justify procedures such as abortion, euthanasia, and right-to-die 
advocacy. The principle of respect, in contrast, attaches a greater 
proportional value to human life than to autonomy or privacy. An 
understanding of this distinction can be of value to the Chlistian bioethicist 
or physician faced with a clinical moral dilemma. 
The Principles of Bioethics 
While not meant to be a complete list, the following represents a 
review of the more widely accepted principles of bioethics in 
contemporary usage. 
The principle of beneficence refers to acts performed for the benefit 
of others. It encompasses acts of mercy and kindness and the obligation to 
do good and avoid evil. Within the Christian tradition, a famous example 
of beneficence is found in the parable of the Good Samaritan. A key 
element of the parable is the ideal of a positive beneficence - that is, a 
positive obligation to provide benefit to others. There are some who argue 
that such a positive obligation does not exist. Instead, they say that 
beneficence is purely a virtuous ideal or act of charity, and thus persons are 
not morally deficient if they fail to act beneficently.6 From the Christian 
perspective, of course, the teachings of Jesus are clear insofar as one's 
positive obligation to their neighbor. 
Nonmaleficence is the moral imperative not to inflict harm or evil. 
It is related to, but differs from beneficence, in that nonmaleficence 
admonishes one in the negative, not to do harm. The principle of 
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beneficence involves a positive action toward preventing or removing 
Nonmaleficence and beneficence are further related in terms of 
actions that involve determination of a risk-to-benefit ratio and the 
principle of double effect. 
A common example of the concept of risk-to-benefit ratio would 
include the use of chemotherapy in the treatment of malignant tumors. The 
medication will cause some harm to normal tissues and to the patient, but 
the expected benefits ordinarily outweigh the risk or the degree of harm to 
the patient. In such situations, the "harm" caused to the patient is morally 
defensible. 
The principle of double-effect is derived from the work of the 
Catholic philosopher and theologian , St. Thomas Aquinas. According to 
this principle, some actions may have other than the intended effect. In 
some cases, these unintended effects may be bad or harmful. However, the 
action can be justified if the bad effect is the unintended result of the initial 
good act. The classic example in medicine is the pregnant woman who 
develops uterine cancer. The proper treatment may include removal of the 
uterus, which in tum will cause the death of the fetus. The death of the 
fetus is an unintended result of the properly indicated and beneficial 
surgery. As such, it is morally permissible.8 
The principle of veracity deals with the obligation of the practitioner 
and the patient to deal with each other in honesty and truth. While it might 
seem obvious that the practitioner should deal truthfully with the patient, it 
should be just as clear that the patient has the same responsibility to be 
truthful with his or her physician. Truthfulness, aside from being an 
obvious moral obligation, has legal implications in terms of disclosure and 
informed consent. The doctrine of disclosure is the ba~s for the obligation 
of the practitioner to provide the patient with the amount and kind of 
information necessary to understand the nature of the condition and the 
various options that may be available. The doctrine of informed consent 
requires that before any risky or invasive procedure can be performed, the 
practitioner must inform the patient of pertinent details about the nature of 
the procedure, its purpose, potential risks involved, and any reasonable 
alternatives that may be available.9 
Among the oldest principles of medical ethics is the promise made 
by physicians to keep confidential any information obtained in the course 
of treating their patients. 1O Confidentiality deals with the patient's 
legitimate expectation that the details of their private lives, health, and 
treatment will be kept confidential. This right to privacy is seen as critical 
to the doctor-patient relationship. Without it, the patient may feel the need 
to withhold information which may be necessary in order to receive proper 
medical care. However, confidentiality is not an absolute right. Under 
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certain circumstances, such as child abuse, physicians have a moral 
obligation (and in many instances a legal one) to report the suspected abuse 
to the appropriate agencies. Children are rightly to be viewed as 
vulnerable and in need of protection when their physical or mental health is 
threatened. In such cases, society's interest in the welfare of these children 
outweighs the patient'S right to confidentiality. 
Consequentialism is the moral theory that states that an action is 
good or bad depending on the balance of its good or bad consequences. 
Entire moral theories have been developed on the idea that an action should 
be judged by its consequences rather than the intention. II In this regard, 
when we are faced with a choice of more than one morally permissible act, 
it is the principle of utility that should guide us to choose the one that 
benefits the most people. 
The principle of justice deals with fairness, that is, that persons 
receive what is their due. In health care, it is most often distributive justice 
that concerns us. It is the principle which governs the fair distribution of 
resources. Problems arise when resources become scarce. In the era of 
managed care and efforts to contain rapidly escalating costs, many ethicists 
have concerned themselves with questions of how to properly allocate 
scarce resources and access to adequate health care. The problem is 
especially difficult because of a myriad of complex issues such as the 
definition of adequate health care, and the government's role in the 
distribution of tax dollars which pay for much of health care in this country 
today. 
Autonomy and Respect 
Autonomy, concisely defined, is the right of self-det;rmination. It 
allows for persons to determine their own course of action, or what 
interventions they will allow upon themselves. It has become an integral 
part of contemporary health care ethics, and has gained sacrosanct status in 
secular bioethics. ' 2 Consider the following statements: 
... there are relatively few bioethicists who argue that respect for 
autonomy is not the preeminent value governing the actions of health 
care providers. 13 
... from the outset, the conceptual framework of bioethics has 
accorded paramount status to the value-complex of individualism, 
underscoring the principles of individual rights, autonomy, self-
determination, and their legal expression in the jurisprudential notion 
of privacy. 14 
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Modern interpretations of autonomy have been influenced by the 
philosophies of Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill. The perspective of 
Kant was that a rational being existed as an end in himself. As such, all 
persons have an unconditional worth, each having the capacity to 
determine his or her own destiny.15 To not violate that autonomy was a 
fundamental moral obligation. This Kantian notion of autonomy seems to 
dominate current bioethical thought. 16 It is easy to see how this 
philosophical approach to autonomy can be used to defend such practices 
as abortion - upholding the woman's autonomy to choose and denying 
the personhood (rational nature) of the embryo/fetus. Likewise with 
proponents of euthanasia and assisted suicide who argue that terminally iII 
persons have the autonomous right to choose the time and manner of their 
death. This near absolute view of autonomy and self-determination finds 
support in the legal arena in relation to the concept of privacy. 
Privacy, as a legal concept in the United States, is a relatively new 
notion arising from various legal decisions during this century. First called 
a "liberty interest," the U.S. courts later began to use the term "privacy" to 
refer to an individual's protection from interference in matters of personal 
choice. Although not specifically enumerated as a constitutional right, the 
decisions of the Supreme Court have upheld privacy as a constitutional 
right because it seemed (to them) to be implied within the Bill of Rights. 
While no doubt controversial in some cases, the Supreme Court has been 
consistent in supporting this view in essentially all of its decisions in the 
past 30 years. From the moral perspective, of course, it is the case of Roe 
v. Wade (1973) that serves as the pivotal event in support of autonomy at 
any cost. 
Autonomy and privacy seem so intimately related that Beauchamp 
and Childress offer respect for one's autonomy as the primary justification 
for the light to privacy. Having done so, they quickly ~dmit that objections 
to this view do exist. Although they choose not to pursue or discuss those 
objections further, they do state that "one possibility ... is to emphasize a 
broader conception of respect for persons that includes both respect for 
their autonomy and respect for their dignity" (italics added).17 This 
statement of theirs seemingly offers a foothold for those who would argue 
against that notion of an absolute autonomy which is so prevalent today. 
Carl E. Schneider, in his book The Practice of Autonomy, sums it up this 
way: " ... now that the law has installed an armory of devices to promote 
patients' autonomy, bioethicists and lawyers need to undertake the grubbier 
but rewarding work of asking what people actually want, how they actually 
behave, and what changes are actually possible."18 
Other persuasive arguments can be made against autonomy as the 
fundamental bioethical principle. One is that the patient's autonomy and 
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decision-making skills may be routinely compromised by illness. 
According to Pellegrino and Thomasma: 
The patient autonomy model does not give sufficient attention to the 
impact of disease on the patient's capacities for autonomy.. . III 
persons often become so anxious, guilty, angry, fearful , or hostile 
that they make judgments they would not make in calmer times . . . 
These primary characteristics of illness alter personal wholeness to a 
profound degree. They also change some of our assumptions about 
the operation of personal autonomy in the one who is ill. 19 
Another argument against autonomy is that in order to respect the 
autonomy of a patient, the practitioner may have to compromise his or her 
own autonomy. For example, the patient's wishes may be contrary to the 
morality or value system of the physician.20 Further, a patient's wishes 
may be at odds with their responsibility to the society at large. As an 
example, a patient may choose not to be vaccinated against a disease which 
presents a danger to the community even though the risk (of vaccination) to 
the patient himself is low.21 
A most compelling argument against the autonomy model is given 
by Nancy Rhoden. Individuals do not exist as totally independent and self-
sufficient decision-makers. According to Rhoden, persons cannot be self-
governing and self-reliant in isolation from others. People exist within a 
framework of personal and social relationships. These relationships partly 
define who the self is and affect the meaningful expression of autonomy.22 
While supportive of autonomy, the philosophy of John Stuart Mill 
offers some further insights as to the weaknesses of autonomy. He was 
more concerned about the individuality (autonomy) of persons in shaping 
their lives. He argued that persons should be permitttd to develop 
according to their personal convictions, as long as they do not interfere 
with a like expression of freedom by others; but he also insisted that we 
sometimes are obligated to seek to persuade others when they have false or 
ill-considered views (italics added). 23 This view that autonomy may be 
relativized, especially in situations involving respect for human dignity, 
has served as an impetus for some authors to consider another principle as 
more fundamental in bioethics. 
The main concept in the principle of respect is the idea that every 
human being has inherent dignity and worth. While not generally 
considered mainstream in contemporary secular bioethics, the principle of 
respect enjoys a considerable amount of support among many researchers. 
As early as 1979, the Belmont Report enumerated respect for persons as 
one of the three principles that it recommended as the basis of ethical 
decision-making in medicine.24 Robert M. Veatch proposes a set of six 
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"substantive" principles which includes respect for life and respect for 
persons. Although he also includes the principle of autonomy in his list, he 
defines it as "the moral necessity of treating one another as autonomous 
members of the moral community free to make choices that do not violate 
other basic ethical requirements (italics added)?5 
A comprehensive treatment of the principle of respect is found in the 
work of Beabout and Wennemann, Applied Professional Ethics: A 
Developmental Approachfor Use with Case Studies (1994). It is of interest 
that while they do not consider the concept of respect for persons to be 
essentially religious in character, they have found that many (students) 
from diverse traditions identify with it very strongly.26 They go on to say: 
The principle of respect for persons will help religious people knit 
their central moral beliefs into the fabric of a common public 
morality befitting professionals . The moral life ought to be made of 
whole cloth . The study of applied professional ethics that focuses on 
moral principles should not be carried out in a vacuum. The 
challenge of such a study is to help develop a balance between the 
diverse personal interests, social roles and moral principles 
encountered by professionals. 27 
In order to fully appreciate the preeminent nature of respect for 
persons as a moral principle, Beabout and Wennemann review the work of 
the developmental psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg. Kohlberg theorized 
that there was a recognized pattern of development in reasoning. At Level 
One, the child is primarily interested in himself. Rules are obeyed out of 
fear of punishment, or the expectation of a reward. The primary criterion 
used for moral decision-making at this level is self-interest. At Level Two, 
the emphasis shifts away from oneself to concern for ore's society. This is 
called the "conventional" level of moral judgment, since decisions are 
based on conformity to the conventions of one's society. Not everyone 
moves into this level. But those who do move into Level Two obey rules 
because they are part of the society. Conformity is seen as important, as is 
concern for fulfilling one's role in society. At Level Three, the emphasis 
shifts away from the norms of one's society to a universal perspective that 
recognizes impartial moral principles. This highest level is called the 
"post-conventional" level , since moral judgments are made based on 
universal moral principles that transcend any particular social conventions. 
Kohlberg claims that not everyone moves into this level, and rarely do so 
before the age of eighteen. At this level , there is a concern for some 
universally applicable moral standard: for example: the principle of respect 
for all human beings as individuals. Good is done because it is a matter of 
conscience to apply a logical, universal standard such as the principle of 
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respect. The principle of respect for persons is a self-chosen criterion of 
moral decision-making. Further, it can function as a criterion for 
evaluating the conventions of societies, including one's own.28 
In their book, Beabout and Wennemann present a list of seven 
principles for moral decision-making: respect, non-malevolence, 
benevolence, integrity, justice, utility, and double effect. They point out, 
however, that all are derived from the foundational principle of respect for 
persons. They define this principle as: 
In every action and every intention, in every goal and every means, 
treat every human being, yourself and others, with the respect 
befitting the dignity and worth of a person 29 
It is their position that all other (moral) principles are subordinate to 
and consistent with respect when considered in a hierarchical order with 
respect as the fundamental principle. 
It would seem clear that a bioethics based on a fundamental principle 
of respect for persons would not be supportive of many of the practices that 
contemporary society tolerates on the basis of personal autonomy. 
Conclusion 
This paper has sought to briefly introduce the concept of principles-
based bioethics, and to concisely review the more widely accepted 
principles in contemporary usage. More importantly, its purpose is to 
compare and contrast the principles of autonomy and respect, and how they 
might influence a more Christian perspective when faced with ethical 
dilemmas in health care. , 
Finally, it should be mentioned that principles-based bioethics are 
but one aspect of a comprehensive approach to health care ethics that must 
ultimately integrate them with values, duties, moral norms, casuistry, and, 
especially for the Christian physician, virtue ethics.30 
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